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Abstract
Everything is phenomenon, everything is gift, or everything is given. This presupposition 
of phenomenology, which makes givenness (Gegebenheit) the starting point for phenome-
nality, is not altogether self-evident. It is not sufficient to look merely at the reverse of the 
gift (phenomenology of the night), but it is a matter of questioning the impossibility of 
even giving (the night of phenomenology). Questioning the strategies of the contemporary 
reappropriations of Kant—radicalization (Heidegger), disproportion (Ricœur), and inver-
sion (Marion)—this text works under a fourth possibility, seldom examined and yet still 
envisaged by Kant: the “Extra-Phenomenal”, or in other words, the “Chaos”, the “pell-mell”, 
the “Cinnabar”, or the “melee of sensations”.
Keywords: phenomenology, donation, night, extra-phenomenal, Cinnabar, melee of sen-
sations, madness, trauma, sickness.
We have, on the one hand, the “phenomenology of night” and, on the other, the “night of phenomenology”; there is an immense gulf, 
indeed an untraversable distance, between the two. To speak of the night of 
phenomenology is not to speak of non-appearance in the possible horizon 
of appearing but of the suppression of appearing itself—the very conditions 
of appearance.1 If the possibility of appearing itself were to disappear, then 
it is not “non-manifestation” which would be in question but, rather, the 
non-possibility of “manifesting.” In contrast to the possibility of the impossi-
bility of the phenomenon—the non-appearance of a phenomenon that could 
1  ‘Appearing’ here translates the French apparoir. Typically used in a juridical context, 
the verb primarily means “to make oneself present” or, more colloquially, “to show up” 
(He appears before the court.). When used in conjunction with faire (faire apparoir), it means 
“to evidence,” “to indicate” (“The defendant’s self-contradictory testimony evidences his 
guilt.). Falque uses the verb apparoir instead of the verb apparaitre, which lacks the twofold 
juridical connotation, and the noun apparition, which would refer to appearances or phenom-
ena in the ontic sense. Thus, “the suppression of appearing [apparoir]” does not denote the 
non-presence of possible phenomena but, more radically, the impossibility of “showing up” 
and, thus, of “evidencing” givenness—something which non-presence, or lack, can still do. 
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appear or that remains withdrawn—there exists (or rather doesn’t) the 
impossibility of the possibility of the phenomenon. This impossibility is not the 
closed horizon of existence (death, for example) but the suppression of the 
possibility itself of a horizon within which something might still appear: 
the annihilation of all transcendental loci of appearing. Such suppression 
or annihilation could result, for example, from radical evil, trauma, or psy-
chological disturbance broadly construed, each of which inflicts suffering 
to the point of numbness and ultimately leads to the disappearance of the 
possibility itself of feeling. Paradoxically, evil [mal] does the most harm [fait 
mal] when it no longer hurts [ne fait plus mal], or when the vital conditions 
by which I am affected are annulled as such.2
Thus, we cannot always be content to speak of phenomena (Husserl), 
appearance (Heidegger), epiphany (Levinas), givenness (Marion), speech 
(Chrétien), inexperience (Lacoste), which is nonetheless a mode of experi-
ence, or auto-affection (Henry), whose ownness [le propre] consists precisely 
in always being affected by itself.3 Put differently, the entire tradition of 
phenomenology (and not just in France) has been fixated—consciously 
or not—on “appearance” to such a degree that non-appearance has been 
understood solely as the privation of a phenomenon that could or should 
otherwise appear. Thus, if there is a “dark night of the soul”—to borrow John 
of the Cross’ spiritual term—then it consists merely in waiting for clarity, 
meaning that any darkness presupposes or is rendered possible by the light.4 
However, can we truly say that all night, all darkness, is nothing but 
the privation of light or of some awaited phenomenon, as if phenomenality 
determined the horizon of all givens? Is there not some “other night,” to 
use Maurice Blanchot’s term—not the primordial night of all-encompassing 
darkness nor the romanticized night that falls upon us in the evening but the 
night in which “everything has disappeared,” the alien night that neither 
shelters us nor lifts upon dawns arrival. The night that casts us out. “This 
night is never pure night. It is essentially impure. It is not that beautiful 
diamond, the void, which Mallarmé contemplates,” says Blanchot. “In the 
night [the phenomenology of night],” he continues, “one can die; we reach 
oblivion, But this other night [the night of phenomenology] is the death no 
2  For more on this point, see my article “Mal et finitude. Dialogue avec Ricoeur et Levinas,” 
Etudes théologiques et religieuses, no. 2 (forthcoming): 413-431.  
3  This point comes from René Descartes’ “Meditation II: Of the Nature of the Human 
Mind; and that it is more easily known than the Body” in his Meditations on First Philosophy: 
“…[I]t is at least quite certain that it seems to me that I see light, that I hear noise and that 
I feel heat. That cannot be false; properly speaking it is what is in me called feeling…” 
(The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press [1911], 10.). This passage of Descartes is analyzed by Michel Henry in his The 
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
4  John of the Cross, Dark Night of the Soul, trans. Mirabai Starr (New York: The Berkley 
Publishing Group, 2002), 13: “The emptiness of the dark night is a yielding emptiness. It is 
an emptiness that gives way to the fullness of all possibility…”
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one dies, the forgetfulness which gets forgotten. In the heart of oblivion it 
is memory without rest.”5 Blanchot’s Thomas is “obscure,” then, in that he 
is nocturnal, or better, in that he himself is Darkness: 
[O]utside himself there was something identical to his own thought 
which his glance or his hand could touch. Repulsive fantasy. Soon the 
night seemed to him gloomier and more terrible than any night, as if it 
had in fact issued from a wound of thought which had ceased to think, 
thought ironically taken as an object by something other than thought. 
It was night itself.6 
In place of the night as lacking light (the night of obscurity), I would 
privilege, then, the night as denied light altogether (the darkness that is 
oblivious even to the possibility itself of being brought to light). Not only 
have apparitions disappeared but also the very possibility of appearing, 
the horizon as such—hence the extra-phenomenal. 
In this way, to question not simply the given but givenness itself—even 
in its lack, which simply reiterates its presence—is to interrogate the possi-
bility itself of signification. Phenomenology and hermeneutics have, unsur-
prisingly given their connectedness, both fallen prey to this fixation on 
appearance in their mutual presupposing of signification. To maintain the 
well-known Husserlian formula that “all consciousness is consciousness of 
something” or even Ricoeur’s claim that “[t]he most fundamental phenomeno-
logical presupposition of a philosophy of interpretation is that every question 
concerning any sort of ‘being’ [étant] is a question about the meaning of that 
‘being’” is de facto to situate all lived experience and understanding within 
the paradigm of signification, albeit this paradigm is denied from time to 
time and the mystery of obscurity is injected therein.7 In overemphasizing 
openness (Dasein), we fail to see that its negation is not merely closure. What 
does or would it mean for a door to shut once and for all, to reach a true 
im-passe because one has forgotten what “getting through it” even means? 
Better, the issue presented by such an impasse, or dead-end, is precisely 
that one becomes issueless to oneself, one’s case seems closed, regardless of 
whether one should or could, in reality, “get through” it. In short, how does 
5  Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1982), “The Outside, The Night.”
6  Maurice Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure, trans. Robert Lamberton (Station Hill Press, 
1989), 14. 
7  M. Blanchot, Thomas the Obscure, 14. French ed., M. Blanchot, Thomas l’Obscur (1950), 
(Paris: L’imaginaire Gallimard, 1992), ch. II, 17. En remerciant Jérôme de Gramont et Kevin Hart 
qui, par leurs travaux et leur amitié, m’auront conjointement conduit sur cette même voie. Cf. 
J. de Gramont, Blanchot et la phénoménologie, L’effacement, L’événement, (Paris: Corlevour, 2011), 
ch. 5, 107–136: “Blanchot and Lévinas” (especially the “first reason”, 110-116: “Thinking 
from the outside”). See also K. Hart, The Dark Gaze: Maurice Blanchot and the Sacred (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), ch. 4, 105–132: “Losing the power to say ‘I’” (especially 
114–120: comment by Thomas the Obscure).
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the extra-phenomenal differ from the non-phenomenal? Such is the question 
signaled by Blanchot’s “outside,” Levinas’ Il y a, Nietzsche’s “chaos,” and 
Bataille’s “heterogeneity.” They all refer to the erasure of the horizon of phe-
nomenology, which means that immanence is neither leapt beyond through 
apophatism (Marion), nor burrowed beneath through Khôra (Derrida), nor 
identified with its frame (Deleuze), nor reduced to pathos (Henry), but 
obstructed and transformed into radically “alien”:
The reality of heterogeneous elements is not of the same order as that of 
homogenous elements. Homogenous reality presents itself with the abstract 
and neutral aspect of strictly defined and identified objects (basically, it is 
the specific reality of solid objects). Heterogeneous reality is that off a force 
or shock… [I]t is identical to the structure of the unconscious.8
This heterogeneity, this mode of “resistance,” which is precisely a sub-
traction of “significance,” poses the question of the limit of phenomenality, 
even of the act of philosophizing itself. Nevertheless, significance is a con-
stant for all phenomenological thinkers, like a transcendental structure of 
the given—albeit overturned and even denied from time to time. For this 
reason, any response to the question thus posed must pass through Kant. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Critique of Pure Reason is the starting point for any 
strategy or method of treating the given. Heidegger, for example, reduces 
the given to finitude and restricts it to the paradigm of space and time as a 
priori forms of sensibility. This reduction to finitude, in the eyes of Ricoeur, 
reveals our fallibility, that is, the limits of our knowledge, the impotence of 
our will, our fragility. Marion’s saturated phenomenon, however, reverses 
this move—a reversal which I contest—and inverses rather than surpasses 
the Kantian categories. However, behind these three different positions 
vis-à-vis Kant—radicalization (Heidegger), disproportion (Ricoeur), and 
inversion (Marion)—lies not exactly a fourth possibility but, more precisely, 
an impossible possibility or, rather, an impossibility of the possible: that which 
renders null, indeed unimaginable, the possibility itself of “imagining” 
either the limit, or disproportionality, or the revealed. Kant glimpses such 
an impossibility in his passage on cinnabar or the “melee of sensations”: 
If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human 
being were now changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if 
on the longest day the land were covered now with fruit, now with ice 
and snow, then my empirical imagination would never even get the 
opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the represen-
tation of the color red.9
8  Georges Bataille, “The Psychological Structure of Fascism,” trans. Carl R. Lovitt, New 
German Critique, no. 16 (Winter 1979): 64–87 (Candor, NY: Telos Press Ltd., 1979), 70. 
9  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), A 101–102. 
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Here, we see that an event, a trauma, or a pure hypothesis ab absurdo 
(interpreting Kant strictly) could render impossible the possibility of syn-
thesizing. A “melee of sensations” (Klossowski’s French translation)—rather 
than an “crowd of phenomena” (Tremsaygues-Pascaud’s French trans-
lation) or a “mass of phenomena” (Renaut’s French translation)—could 
disrupt the transcendental horizon of appearance or phenomenality to the 
point of disintegrating it as such, thereby blocking appearance altogether—
nullifying its limits, the disproportion it signals, or that which overflows 
it. “Unity of synthesis,” explains Kant, “according to empirical concepts, 
would be purely accidental…unless these were founded on a transcendental 
ground of unity, a [melee of sensations] might rush into our soul, without ever 
forming real experience.”10
Pandora’s Box 
The extra-experiential—neither the sub-experiential (Khôra) nor the 
super-experiential (Revelation)—is precisely what Heidegger seemed to 
have seen while treating Nietzsche’s notion of chaos in his Freiburg lecture 
course from the second semester of 1940. However, he could not afford 
to plunge into such depths, that is, to see that chaos cannot not be seen 
because it is itself the impossibility of seeing. In other words, Heidegger 
peeked inside Pandora’s Box with Kant’s notion of the melee of sensations 
but chose to reseal it at once because it radically contradicted his fixation on 
appearance and the presupposition of meaning to which it remained bound:
Kant even speaks of the “melee of sensations,” meaning by that the chaos, 
the jumble, that crowds us, keeps us occupied, concerns us, washes over 
us and tunnels through us—one says, with apparently even greater pre-
cision, through “our bodies”—not only in the moment of perceiving 
this blackboard [which bears the chaotic mass of trace markings] but 
constantly and everywhere.
In this way, Kant directs us towards what Heidegger calls “the region 
of what can no longer be said.”11 Right away, though, Heidegger adds the 
following so as not to tend towards the extra-phenomenal, which would 
destabilize his paradigm: 
To know this thing as a blackboard, we must already have ascertained 
what we encounter as a “thing”… Must we not also take back this invasion 
by what we encounter through the words in which we have taken hold 
10  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, “Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the 
Categories as Knowledge a priori.” 
11  Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987), 
78–79. 
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of what was encounter, in order to possess what is purely encountered, to 
let it be encountered?12 
That passage marks Heidegger’s closure of Pandora’s Box, so to speak, 
or the covering-over of his dis-covery. Heidegger’s thought never moves 
from presupposed meaning to non-meaning or to the absence of mean-
ing—in fact, anxiety before death raises and arises from the question of 
meaning. Heidegger always conducts the phenomenon by way of lan-
guage in order to reach its “true meaning”; he always situates it within 
thought or poetry and thereby relentlessly pursues meaningfulness. Both 
death and thought, rather than marking a suppression of the horizon, are 
precisely the opposite: they constitute the openness or ek-stasis of Dasein 
by which meaning is given or received even as it withdraws, always ready 
to manifest itself. Like a rodent laying low in its den, meaning does not 
stir until a pursuant approach; hence, the phenomenologist is something 
of a foxhound in that he brings the beast out of hiding without being able 
to capture or master it. There is, then, a certain passivity in the phenome-
nologist’s pro-vocation of meaning, as its manifestation often overflows, 
even overwhelms, him. In this way, the phenomenologist himself is put 
on trial by the phenomenon, as it forces him to admit the fundamental 
incompetence and incapacity of his “vision,” that is, his ability to find 
words and attitudes to put in service of the given. Hence, the phenome-
nologist’s diakonia towards a given phenomenon often results in a neglect 
of those moments when the possibility of meaningfulness itself is torn 
asunder, when the very horizon of appearing is wiped away. The abyss, 
chaos, the void—or, better still, “the extra-phenomenal,” to say it in (non) 
transcendental terms—has therefore never been treated within phenome-
nology (though Levinas is close with his Il y a) because the entire tradition 
conceives phenomenality as necessarily consisting of a constituted and a 
constituter, even in moments of excess when the former takes precedence 
over the latter and the categories are reversed. In short, in absence of these 
criteria, nothing can be given.  
In Greek mythology, Zeus prohibited the goddess of “all gifts” [Pan-dora] 
from unleashing her box upon the world, as it contained all the evils of 
humanity (old age, sickness, war, hunger, misery, death, vice, etc.); how-
ever, to open it here and thus to face the destruction of all horizons and 
the blockage of future givens is not to condemn us to such a fate. To open 
Pandora’s Box is simply to recognize that the rift precedes the revealed. In 
other words, there is a primordial void that denies the possibility of man-
ifesting—particularly evident in psychoses (depression, obsession, and 
schizophrenia), which leave us stupefied. Let us follow, then, and radicalize, 
this remark from Henri Maldiney’s Penser l’homme et la folie: 
12  Heidegger, 78–79. 
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This void, the void does not result from numerous and repeated fis-
sures. It is primordial… The moment of collapse cannot be placed. It has 
always already taken place, but its place cannot be placed psychically. It is 
nowhere. Something took place that “has no place.” The subject responds 
in himself and in history to this dimension of absence.13
To be sure, Kant did open the horizon of finitude; he did reveal the basis 
of human fallibility; and he did break ground for the saturated phenomenon. 
Ultimately, though, he made a bet and immediately folded his hand, so to 
speak, and it is up to us to play it out—no small task. Properly speaking, 
Kant glimpsed the extra-phenomenal but renounced it at once. To conclude 
his passage on cinnabar, he claims, “There must therefore be something 
that itself makes possible this reproduction of the appearances by being 
the a priori ground of a necessary synthetic unity of them.”14 Kant’s claim 
here resembles the famous turning point in Descartes’ Meditations on First 
Philosophy: “Such people are insane, and I would be thought equally mad 
if I modelled myself on them.”15
I set my goal modestly, then, as the “opening of a field” or as the deploy-
ment of “contemporary strategies” to recover this notion of chaos, or the 
extra-phenomenal, because such a recovery consists precisely in a certain 
reticence. Put differently, my contribution has perhaps the most difficult 
possible task of pointing to that which is precisely not there. Evidently, much 
work has already been done to interrogate Kant’s “melee of sensations”—
the only true example of this rift or void, this extra- or Il y a—and the cat-
egory of phenomenality (thinking back to Heidegger’s finitude, Ricoeur’s 
fallibility and disproportion, and Marion’s saturated phenomenon), but, 
thankfully, the philosophical task is never complete. 
Finitude and Radicalization
Heidegger’s reading of Critique of Pure Reason does have the merit of 
remaining faithful to Kant’s aim of finding a starting point for metaphys-
ics: space and time as “a priori forms of sensibility,” which Heidegger 
will rename finitude. “We have undertaken the present interpretation of 
the Critique of Pure Reason,” explains Heidegger near the end of Kant and 
the Problem of Metaphysics, “in order to bring to light the necessity, insofar 
as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics is concerned, of posing the 
13  Henri Maldiney, Penser l’homme et la folie (Grenoble: J. Millon, 2007), 299–300. 
14  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 101. 
15  Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy. “First Meditation: On what can be called into 
doubt.” So as not to rehash the Foucault-Derrida debate here, see my reorientation of this 
passage—in terms of embodiment rather than rationality—“Le fou désincarné” in Descartes 
et la phénoménologie, ed. Riquier and Pradelle (Paris: Hermann, forthcoming). 
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fundamental problem of the finitude in man.”16 The originality of Kantbuch 
lies, at least partially, in its insistence on finite intuition, hence the impor-
tance accorded to the exegesis of the first formula from “Transcendental 
Aesthetic”: “In whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge 
may relate to objects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which 
it immediately relates to them is by means of an intuition.”17 Put differently, 
this “crucial sentence” which, according to Heidegger, we must “hammer 
home,” demands that we always stick to the finite horizon of our existence. 
Let us not forget that Heidegger considered the Kantbuch (1929) a further 
development of the second section of Being and Time concerning “Dasein 
and temporality” (1927).18 Moreover, he thought one could be sure in advance 
and independently of an object’s givenness that nothing could be known or 
perceived outside of the horizon of space and time. Hence, the Kantian 
notion that noumena, or things in themselves (God, freedom, the beginning 
of the world, or immortality), could be thought wholly outside the category 
of “phenomena,” not even as “bracketed” or “suspended,” marks an aspect 
of Kantianism which Heidegger never found a way to incorporate given 
his desire to remain within “pure phenomenality.” 
Nonetheless, Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant is more complex than 
a strict respect for the horizon of finitude, as he does not simply reiterate 
the Kantian categories of space and time as “a priori forms of sensibility” 
but extends them to a transcendental schema. In Heidegger own words, 
“As pure intuition, time is that which furnishes an aspect (Anblick) prior 
to all experience. This is why the pure aspect…which presents itself in 
such pure intuition must be termed a pure image.” He continues, citing 
the Critique of Pure Reason, “Kant himself states: ‘The pure image of…all 
objects of the senses in general [is] time.’”19 We see, then, that Heidegger is 
interested less in the categories themselves, which is likewise the case for 
Ricoeur and Marion, than in their figuration or “concretization” enacted 
by linking the understanding to sensibility via the imagination as the 
nexus of space and time. The problem, then, is not (or not yet) the lack 
or excess of the phenomenon with respect to its recipient—a Husserlian, 
even pseudo-Cartesian, question that would have led Kant astray from his 
originary radical finitude. On the contrary, the problem is how to main-
tain a “pure respect” for phenomenality in terms of an insurmountable 
16  Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1962). “The Problem of the Finitude in Man and the Metaphysics 
of Dasein,” 225. 
17  Kant, “The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements: First Part, Transcendental Aesthetic” 
in Critique of Pure Reason. 
18  Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. “Preface to the First Edition”: “The 
analysis of the Critique of Pure Reason proposed here traces back to the second part of Sein 
und Zeit.”
19  Heidegger, 107, citing Critique of Pure Reason, A 142/B 182. 
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“finitude of transcendence” (or openness). “Far from being ‘confused’, 
the chapter on schematism is perfectly clear in its construction… This 
only becomes evident, however, when the finitude of transcendence 
is comprehended as the ground of the intrinsic possibility (i.e., of the 
necessity) of metaphysics…”20
On this point, Heidegger’s reading is all but incontrovertible. His radi-
calization of both Kant’s “a priori forms of sensibility” (the “Transcendental 
Aesthetic”) and his “schematism” (the “Transcendental Analytic”) as “fin-
itude” is uncompromisingly rigorous. Heidegger takes the Critique of Pure 
Reason to its logical end on the basis of its own grounding in the a priori 
horizon of space and time. In other words, he resists overemphasizing the 
“Transcendental Dialectic” that could either serve to offset the given (the 
antinomy of pure reason) or lead one to believe that it could be surpassed 
(the ideal of pure reason). Reading Being and Time retrospectively in light 
of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, then, allows us to understand bet-
ter the attacks—justified in this case—launched by Dominique Janicaud 
in his Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: “[O]ver the last thirty or so 
years…[the] trait that distinguishes [French phenomenology] decisively 
from the time of its first reception…is…the rupture with immanent phe-
nomenality.”21 Heidegger only concerns himself with the relation between 
horizontal immanence and vertical transcendence—with the exception of 
denouncing the objectification of the divine as a Super Being according 
to a so-called “onto-theo-logic”—when it comes to the relation between 
finitude (horizontal immanence) and Dasein (transcendental openness), 
hence the expression “finitude of transcendence,” which appears first in 
Kantbuch. “Transcendental finitude” and “limited openness” are synonyms 
in that space and time—even within Heideggerian thought—denote a priori 
structures of phenomenality. The fourfold [Geviert] of his later thought, 
which is brought together under the title of “the thing [das Ding],” is no 
exception to this rule.
Since Heidegger’s radicalization proved to be so fruitful, let us con-
tinue down his path and radicalize his radicalization in pursuit of what I 
have called “strategies to recover” chaos, the melee of sensations, or the 
extra-phenomenal. To do so requires a single question: If, as I have argued, 
Heidegger chose to reseal Pandora’s Box, so to speak, when he encountered 
Kant’s melee of sensations in his commentary on Nietzsche’s chaos (1940), 
then might he have already anticipated this problem in Kantbuch (1929)? 
This question is not merely a textual-historical matter; it has high stakes 
for phenomenology as well. Though the extra-phenomenal is identifiable 
with neither a radicalization (Heidegger), nor a disproportion (Ricoeur), 
nor an inversion (Marion) of Kantian categories, might Heidegger’s reading 
20  Heidegger, 116–117. 
21  Dominique Janicaud, Phenomenology and the Theological Turn: The French Debate (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 17. 
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of Kant nonetheless trace, or at least point to, the path I wish to lead here? 
Our first clue comes not from Kantbuch but from Contributions to Philosophy 
(1936): “The interpretation of Kant’s thought can here gain essential clarity 
and can then lead us to see that, even with this position of the subject, phil-
osophical thinking does not escape an encounter with the abysses (schematism 
and transcendental imagination).”22 
Here, we find ourselves at an interpretive crossroads, one side of which 
has yet to be explored. Readings of the Critique of Pure Reason have histor-
ically tended towards idealism, which is unfaithful to the work’s initial 
project, and it is a safe bet that (French) phenomenological interpretations—
specifically those associated with the theological turn—have made the 
same mistake. They have emphasized idealism when they should have 
held fast to space and time as a priori forms of sensibility. To be sure, as I 
have already said, fixating on the “Transcendental Dialectic,” which can 
lead to either a contradiction or an over-idealization of pure reason, results 
in a neglect of the “Transcendental Aesthetic” (space and time) and of the 
“Transcendental Analytic” (schematism and imagination). Such neglect 
ultimately results in a certain Cartesian interpretation of Kant, which takes 
one far afield from Kant’s original project. What I have elsewhere called 
“the preemption of the infinite over the finite” or the “Cartesianism of 
French phenomenology” is rooted, in fact, in this debate over Kant.23 “[T]
he [Critique of Pure Reason] remained groundless and had to lead soon to a 
development beyond itself, which was carried out partially with its own 
means (the transcendental mode of questioning), a development towards 
absolute knowledge (German Idealism).”24
Fallibility and Disproportion
Ricoeur’s thought takes us one step closer to chaos, that is, to the destruc-
tion of all horizons and thus to the extra-phenomenal. He is instrumental 
for our purposes not because he principally deals with evil, suffering, and 
tragedy—in deep contrast to Heidegger, who is haunted by death-anxiety 
and the question of meaning—but, more precisely, because he treats them 
symbolically, and, as he says, “symbols give rise to thought.”25 In other words, 
unthinkable evil can and must happen in the horizon of the thinkable; 
hence, it is “un-thinkable” mostly as a matter of speech, and its so-called 
22  Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and 
Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). § 262, 353. Translation 
modified. 
23  Emmanuel Falque, The Metamorphosis of Finitude, trans. George Hughes (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2012). § 5.  
24  Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, 249. 
25  Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Harper & Row: New 
York, 1967), 19. 
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unthinkability consists not only of excess (it overwhelms us) but also of 
lack (we cannot bring ourselves to understand it). However, as with all 
phenomena, evil remains bound to the horizon of thought in that it does 
not destroy thinkability as such, which refers not simply to some thought 
content but the horizon of thinking itself. Being unable to conceive of an 
evil act because it is “unthinkable” in the sense that it overwhelms or under-
whelms our horizon of thought is not the same as being unable to conceive 
an evil deed because the evil act destroys the very possibility of thinking. 
One is stupefied by traumatic situations; one no longer thinks or, perhaps 
more accurately put, one thinks that one is no longer able to think. In this 
way, trauma plunges one into thoughtlessness, into oblivion. The thing to 
which evil “gives rise,” then, is the impossibility of one’s “giving rise” to 
anything at all (thought included); in this way, the supposed requisites of 
givenness are rendered null.26
Looking now to the conclusion of Fallible Man, Ricoeur sees fit—like 
Marion later on—to base his analysis on Kantian categories: “Our guide in 
this deduction of the categories of fallibility will be the Kantian triad of the 
categories of quality: reality, negation, limitation.”27 As with Heidegger’s 
“finitude” and Marion’s “saturated phenomenon”—by radicalization and 
inversion, respectively—Ricoeur’s “fallibility” comes from a certain inter-
pretation, or appropriation, of the Critique of Pure Reason. In each case, the 
Kantian horizon remains—and we will likely never escape it entirely—; 
however, none of the three adequately treats the “melee of sensations.” 
They fail to recognize that it is not a matter of a fourth “synthesis”—as if 
there could have been a third or fourth “reduction”—but of a destruction 
or an annihilation of all syntheses as a result of which finitude, fallibility, 
and saturation become unthinkable, indeed unviable. In such cases, thought 
stops, and one is rendered speechless. Thus, perhaps Blanchot’s “silence of 
darkness” (the other night) from Thomas the Obscure is no less philosophical 
than Pseudo-Dionysius’ “dazzling obscurity of Silence” (the primordial 
night) from Mystical Theology. Furthermore, it makes no sense to say that 
one is spiritual and the other not, for the mystical is not only a matter of 
elevation but also of descent and kenosis, at least in Christianity. The Lofty 
God of Judaism bears a deep contrast to the Lowly God of Christianity; such 
a lesson can be drawn from this essay even if its aim (the extra-phenomenal) 
is principally philosophical.28
26  For more on this point, see my “Mal et finitude. Dialogue avec Ricoeur et Lévinas,” 
Etudes théologiques et religieuses, no. 2 (2017): 413-431 (forthcoming).  
27  Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Fordham University Press: New 
York, 1986), 134. 
28  For more on this lofty-lowly distinction, see “Khôra or the Great Bifurcation” and “A 
Phenomenology of the Underground” (especially § 13 ) in The Loving Struggle, trans. Lucas 
McCracken and Bradley B. Onishi (Baltimore: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming). 
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Returning to Ricoeur, or rather to Kant, the “Table of Categories”—
specifically the “triad of quality”—designates, strictly speaking, what 
makes “synthesis” possible, which Critique of Pure Reason defines as “the 
action of putting different representations together with each other and 
comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.”29 Thus, as is clear, 
the synthesis of a given manifold in and through the concept makes pos-
sible representation as such. However, with the “Table of Categories,” 
or the “pure concepts of understanding,” we are still far from the tran-
scendental schematism, or the “a priori principles of the possibility of 
experience,” which is worth noting since whoever sticks to the “Table of 
Judgments” or categories has yet to arrive at the “Table of Principles.” In 
effect, abstractly conceiving “reality, negation, and limitation” (the triad 
of quality) or “quantity, quality, relation, and modality” (the structures 
of the “Table of Judgments”), like Ricoeur and Marion respectively, is not 
the same as putting them in play with the “Table of Principles” (axioms 
of intuition, anticipations of perception, analogies of experience, or pos-
tulates of empirical thought in general) as does Heidegger. The latter case 
raises the issue of what Kant calls “The Schematism of the Pure Concepts 
of Understanding,” which consists of the following “concrete” problem: 
“applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances.” “[I]t is 
clear,” Kant continues, “that there must be a third thing, which must stand 
in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance 
on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the 
latter.”30 In other words, one’s choice to emphasize the categories over 
the schematism or vice-versa will determine one’s entire understanding 
of Kant. However, what is most crucial to the schematism is not what 
complies with it but what resists it. Precisely in the schematism of the imag-
ination, the “melee of sensations” frustrates synthesis—“which grounds 
even the possibility of all experience (as that which the reproducibility 
of the appearances necessarily presupposes)”—and in so doing causes 
no-thing to appear.31 
That being said, Ricoeur certainly does not ignore the transcendental 
schematism in Fallible Man (1960). In fact, he grounds human fragility in 
the “blind but indispensable” function of imagination or consciousness.32 
However, he sees it merely as “the synthesis as effected outside” that allows 
“the thing [to show] itself and [to] be expressed”:
Here, consciousness is nothing else than that which stipulates that a thing 
is a thing only if it is in accordance with this synthetic constitution, if it 
can appear and be expressed, if it can affect me in my finitude and lend 
29  Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 77. 
30  Kant, A 138.
31  Kant, A 101–102. 
32  Kant, A 78. 
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itself to the discourse of any rational being… [I] prefer to say that the 
synthesis is primarily one of meaning and appearance.33
We see, then, that meaning and self-showing remain the horizon of syn-
thesis. One is tempted to think that Ricoeur somehow missed or ignored 
Kant’s passages on cinnabar and the melee of sensations, which are at 
the very heart of the synthesis of imagination, but his quality as a reader 
makes such an hypothesis untenable. It is more likely that he saw chaos or 
the extra-phenomenal all too clearly and chose to exclude it, like Heidegger 
(“Must we not also take back this invasion by what we encounter through the 
words in which we have taken hold of what was encounter…?”) and Kant 
before him (“There must therefore be something that itself makes possible 
this reproduction of the appearances…”). Immediately after insisting upon 
the twofold necessity of the phenomenon and signification, Ricoeur adds 
the following: 
An appearance which could in no way be express, which would exclude 
itself from the realm of discourse, and which would not allow itself to 
be anticipated in any “sense” would literally be the fleeting appearance 
that Plato compares to the statues of Daedalus, which nothing can tie 
down.34
What does it mean to be excluded from the realm of discourse, which is 
to say from the realm of meaning and, thus, from phenomenality? Does 
the difference between traumatism and fragility, or vulnerability, consist 
precisely in that exclusion from meaning? These are the questions Ricoeur 
leaves unanswered, either failing to see them or, more likely, not daring 
to plumb their depths. I would say that the question of evil constitutes the 
heart of Ricoeur’s thought, and the tragic is thoroughly treated therein, to 
be sure. His contributions on that point are immense. However, interpret-
ing “finitude” in terms of “fallibility,” or intentionally fusing “limits” and 
“limitation” to the point of claiming that “the initial guiding concept of…
an anthropology is and cannot be that of finitude” does not and cannot 
reveal the extra-phenomenal, which has been danced around by so many 
thinkers. In Ricoeur’s thought, finitude exists simply to be overcome; it 
is open to being transcended—albeit in and through insufficiency itself. 
He refuses the unconditional horizontality of immanence, finitude’s cho-
retic resistance, and anything that is non-transcendentally external to it, 
such as the extra-phenomenal. In Fallible Man, finitude tends towards its 
own “transgression,” and herein lies Ricoeur’s (irenic?) disproportion that 
constitutes our humanity. According to Ricoeur, because finitude is only 
expressed via “discourse,” which is to say in and through meaning, the 
33  Ricoeur, Fallible Man, 37–42. 
34  Ricoeur, 38. Emphasis added. 
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necessity of “infinitude,” then, must be imprinted upon finitude itself. This 
claim issues from a presupposition that, in my eyes, is far from self-evi-
dent—despite being consist among a number of discourses—and derives 
from a postulate of spirituality: 
In order for human finitude to be seen and expressed, a moment that 
surpasses it must be inherent in the situation, condition, or state of 
being finite. This means that every description of finitude is abstract, 
i.e., separated and incomplete, if it neglects to account for the trans-
gression that makes discourse on finitude possible. The complete 
discourse on finitude is a discourse on the finitude and the infinitude 
of man.35
Ricoeur’s reference to the Kantian triad takes “limitation” and not “limit” 
as its third term. The former, from the “Transcendental Analytic,” signals an 
expectation of something else, something beyond, whereas the latter, from 
the “Transcendental Aesthetic,” would have represented a strict adherence 
to the immanent horizon of space and time. “[T]he triad of realty, negation, 
and limitation,” he explains, “may be expressed in the following three terms: 
originating affirmation, existential difference, human mediation.” It is precisely 
the third term (human mediation) that creates the gap between one’s finite 
self and one’s constant desire to overcome or to transcend finitude: “Not 
just any limitation constitutes the possibility of failing, but that specific 
limitation which consists, for human reality, in not coinciding with itself.”36 
This incompatibility or non-coincidence of oneself with oneself—in a move-
ment that goes from Descartes’ “generosity” to Maurice Blondel’s “willing 
vs. willed will”—Ricoeur will name “vulnerability” or “fragility.” “The 
‘disproportion’ whose exegesis we have been pursuing through knowing, 
acting, and feeling,” specifies Ricoeur, “takes on the name of fragility in 
the affective order.”37
To conclude this section, I wish to clarify that it is not the “disproportion 
of oneself to oneself” per se which is my precise concern. More specifically, 
the issue is Ricoeur’s negligence of chaos or his failure to treat the extra-phenom-
enal in his development of it, especially given that “disproportion” derives 
from a certain reading of the Kantian categories of quality and deals with 
infinitude and vulnerability. The most likely conclusion is that Ricoeur 
saw but opted not to explore the extra-phenomenal. He did not altogether 
omit the schematism—and therefore the concrete application of the cate-
gories to experience—but took it as a given because of its sensible nature 
without interrogating the possibility of the impossibility of givenness within 
the categories (the supra-phenomenal) or, more precisely, the impossibility 
35  Ricoeur, 25. 
36  Ricoeur, 135, 133. 
37  Ricoeur, 125. 
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of the possibility of givenness outside the categories (the extra-phenomenal). 
This same line of critique will allow us to step beyond Marion’s “saturated 
phenomenon,” which fails to exit the Kantian categories—unlike Kant’s own 
passages on cinnabar and the melee of sensations—but merely “inverts” 
them and thus depends upon them entirely. 
Saturation and Inversion
The tirade of French actor and playwright Sacha Guitry—“Women, I 
am against them…totally against them”—is well known, at least among the 
French, and although I certainly do not mean to endorse the potentially 
chauvinistic quality of the letter38, I do wish to reflect on its logic in a certain 
way. To inverse Kant’s categories and, therefore, to privilege “saturation” 
(the sublime) over “limitation” (the categorical Kantian phenomenon or the 
common-law phenomenon), is this not in fact to remain within the categories 
and, thus, to depend upon them? If, in the same way Ricoeur developed 
his notions of disproportion, desire, and vulnerability, Marion formulated 
“saturation” vis-à-vis Kantian categories to show how an excess of intuition 
overwhelms intention, then does he not make the same oversight as Ricoeur, 
not to mention Heidegger before him? In short, does Marion not also ignore 
the extra-phenomenal, which is precisely not an excess of phenomenality 
that overflows its horizon but a shocking event or trauma that shatters the 
horizon itself? 
Paradoxically, though in keeping with Marion’s unacknowledged rap-
prochement to Ricoeur, which is perhaps surprising to many, the two 
thinkers share the same starting point with respect to Kant.39 As previ-
ously cited, Ricoeur says, “Our guide in this deduction of the categories 
of fallibility will be the Kantian triad of the categories of quality: reality, 
negation, limitation.” Nearly identically, Marion states the following in 
Being Given: “I will sketch a description of the saturated phenomenon 
by following the lead of the categories of the understanding defined 
by Kant”; the two starting points differ only in that Marion’s analysis 
38  Sacha Guitry, “Don’t listen, women, I’m talking to men,” Les lettres d’amour (1941) in 
the National Library of France archives: “I’ve said it once, I’m saying it now, and I’ll say it 
again: women, I am against them…totally against them. Why? Because one must keep one’s 
friends close and one’s enemies even closer. Women have been my greatest enemies, the 
most implacable and the most adorable. I cannot give them up, for a woman is the most 
violent and costly drug. But they are so adorable, charming, and desirable, especially those 
who make you miss them after the fact. Oh men, you big bumbling, feeble children, I speak 
on your behalf. Thankfully, there are some exceptions, but I cannot but be against them, 
totally against them, and I pray to the heavens always to remain so.”
39  See Marion’s “Givenness and Hermeneutics,” The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, trans. 
Jean-Pierre Lafouge (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2013). The article, which is 
the only properly hermeneutic essay of Marion, never cites Ricoeur. 
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deals with the category of “the understanding.”40 In this way, Marion’s 
saturated phenomenon is to the category of the understanding what Ricoeur’s 
fallibility is to the categories of quality—which themselves belong to the 
same category of the understanding in Kant. The starting point is the 
same even if it plays out in radically different ways for each thinker—
the disproportion of “limitation” to “reality” and “negation” for Ricoeur 
and the inversion of the categories of understanding (quantity, quality, 
relation, and modality) for Marion: 
[T]he saturated phenomenon exceeds these categories…, since in it 
intuition passes beyond the concept. I will therefore follow them by 
inverting them. The saturated phenomenon will be described as invis-
able according to quantity, unbearable according to quality, absolute 
according to relation, irregardable according to modality.41
Here, one could level Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche against Marion, 
and perhaps also against Ricoeur: to invert [Umkehrung] any logic in an 
effort to overcome it [Überwindung] is merely to perfect it [Vollendung]. 
That is to say, one does not overcome metaphysics by inversing it or, with 
respect to Heidegger’s original critique, Nietzsche cannot get rid of the soul 
by replacing it with the body: “The fundamental metaphysical position 
expresses the way in which the one who poses the guiding question remains 
enmeshed in the structures of that question, which is not explicitly unfold-
ed…”42 Put differently, with help from Jean Beaufret’s expert commentary, 
“Does Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism not respond, from within the Platonic 
paradigm, to something Platonic, which then becomes all the more visible in 
light of that reversal?”43 Thinking “against” always risks becoming “totally 
against” such that one actually comes to depends upon that which one is 
attempting to surpass.
However, as a loyal disciple of Heidegger, this critique is not lost on 
Marion, and his deliberate effort to think “outside” of metaphysics means 
no longer depending “upon” it. Marion sees that it does not suffice to inverse 
the Kantian categories, which risks remaining in them through that very 
inversion; instead, he aims to escape them altogether: 
Here finally it is necessary that we no longer define the saturated 
phenomenon simply by the inversion of the determinations of the com-
40  Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. 
Kosky (Stanford: Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2002), 199. The same quote appears 
word for word in Marion’s original formulation of the saturated phenomenon in “The 
Saturated Phenomenon,” Philosophy Today 40, no. 1 (Chicago: DePaul University Press, 1996). 
41  Marion, Being Given, 199. Emphasis added. 
42  Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, trans. David Farrell 
Krell (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979), 191. 
43  “Dialogue avec Heidegger” in Philosophie Moderne, 195.
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mon-law phenomenon. With the phenomenon of revelation, we come 
to the point where it is necessary to free ourselves not only from these 
(metaphysical or phenomenological) determinations, but even from 
their destruction.44 
Marion’s move here is crucial. Having had some time between the “first” 
and “second” versions of the saturated phenomenon, he sees the trap set 
by inversion and is able to avoid it. In Being Given, the “Revealed” no lon-
ger belongs to a fourth type of saturated phenomena, which classification 
would mean remaining on the level of a simple inversion, as everything in 
that case would be developed in relation to the categories. However, since 
Revelation is not reduced to a fourth type of saturation, it marks a move-
ment beyond the categories, one that therefore alleges neither to belong to 
nor to depend upon them: 
This first study (“The Saturated Phenomenon” [1992]) included Revelation 
directly among the saturated phenomena by numbering it in fourth posi-
tion, whereas the later study (Being Given [1997]) takes the precaution of 
distinguishing the four types of saturated phenomena (event, idol, flesh, 
and icon, thus established in their specificity) from “the phenomenon of 
revelation,” which “concentrates the four types of saturated phenomena” 
in a “fifth type.”45
Although Ricoeur and Marion share a starting point, they set out in 
opposing directions. The former thinks from within metaphysical categories 
(hence disproportion), whereas the latter seeks to overcome them (hence the 
move from inversion to liberation). The fact that Marion does not cite Ricoeur 
attests to this divergence. If we continue down this path in pursuit of the 
impossibility of the possibility of the phenomenon, then we must address not the 
“counter-experiential” but the “extra-experiential.” Far from a “fifth type” of 
saturation—called “phenomenality to the second degree,” the “paradox to 
the second degree,” or the “saturation of saturation” by Being Given, whose 
paradigm of saturation is articulated solely in terms of significance, albeit an 
overwhelming and unbearable significance—, the extra-phenomenal overturns 
the very possibility of appearing and thus of significance, indeed of givenness 
itself.46 Rather than maintaining that “[the nonobject]…appear[s], since it 
must appear in the measure of the excess of giving intuition in it” and, thus, 
that “[c]ounter-experience is not equivalent to a nonexperience, but to the 
experience of a phenomenon that…resists the conditions of objectification,” 
I wish to interrogate the (non)significance of the impossibility of appearing 
44  Marion, Being Given, 245. Emphasis added. 
45  Marion, The Visible and the Revealed, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008). “Note on the Origin of the Texts,” xiv. Citing Being Given, 
235. 
46  Marion, Being Given, 236–247. 
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itself that marks the destruction of the horizon of appearing.47 In short, the issue 
is not the givenness of the phenomenon of non-givenness (a phenomenology of 
night); rather, it is the non-givenness of givenness itself—neither by privation nor 
by excess but by abnegation (the night of phenomenology). Kant’s cinnabar 
or his “melee of sensations” is not merely a “fourth synthesis”; instead, as 
Gilles Deleuze saw, it is a “vanishing point,” the “the empty space that ceases 
even to be a sign of lack,” a “line of flight that wanders so much the line itself 
disappears, whose wandering leads to madness.”48 
*
There is therefore something more radical than showing the givenness 
of things or that things can be given even in their abandon, which itself 
becomes an a priori criterion of givenness, since precisely no-thing is given 
therein. That is to say, there are forms of darkness, like in Blanchot’s Thomas 
the Obscure or Levinas’ Il y a, in the midst of which we can only be-there 
(Da-sein but without openness or closure)—a being-there that can only be 
characterized as “stupefied,” to use Ludwig Binswanger’s term, or “afraid,” 
to use Romano’s (inherited from Maldiney):
I would go to the doctor and wait in an adjoining room. Through my own 
sobbing, I would hear horrible moans (from my husband). The doctor 
told him he had a small wound in his bladder, but he turned around to 
me with a look so frightening and so devoid of hope that I remained frozen 
in terror, mouth agape.49 
To be sure, there is the un-thinkable, which is always given in and through 
thought even though it overflows it (counter-experience), but there is also 
the un-thinkable, which destroys the possibility itself of thought. It is pre-
cisely the latter which we must paradoxically think, at the limits of a dis-
cursivity of the extra-experiential whose possibility Kant glimpsed: 
47  Marion, Being Given. “Counter-Experience,” 215. 
48  Arnaud Villani, La guêpe de l’orchidée, Essai sur Gilles Deleuze (Paris: Belin, 2000), 118–119. 
For more on this point, see Jean-Clet Martin’s remarkable articulation of Deleuze’s reread-
ing or deconstruction—really an ex-construction—of Kant: La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze 
(originally titled Variations, La philosophie de Gilles Deleuze [1993]), (Paris: Payot-Rivages, 
2005). See in particular pages 38–66: “L’empirisme transcendental” and the perspective of the 
“Dehors” [exteriority, outside, extra-], which is inherited from Blanchot and Foucault and 
developed by Deleuze himself in Foucault (Paris: Editions  de Minuit [2004]. 93: “Thinking 
does not depend on a tidy interior wherein the visible is united language but results from 
the intrusion of an exteriority [un dehors] that closes the supposed gap between inside and 
outside by force and dismembers the interior.”)
49  Ludwig Binswanger, Le cas Suzanne Urban (Paris: Gérard Montfort, 1988), 20. Cited 
and discussed by Maldiney in “L’existant” in Penser l’homme et la folie, 230–231, which in 
turn is cited in Romano’s Event and World, trans. Shane Mackinlay (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2009), § 16.  
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If one were to suppose that nothing preceded an occurrence that it must 
follow in accordance with a rule…, [then] we would have only a play 
of representations that would not be related to any object at all, i.e., by 
means of our perception no appearance would be distinguished from 
any other as far as the temporal relation is concerned.
This land [of the understanding]… is an island, and enclosed in unal-
terable boundaries by nature itself. It is the land of truth (a charming 
name), surrounded by a broad and stormy ocean, the true seat of illusion, 
where many a fog bank and rapidly melting iceberg pretend to be new lands 
and, ceaseless deceiving with empty hopes the voyager looking around 
for new discoveries, entwine him in adventures from which he can never 
escape and yet also never bring to an end.50
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